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In his more than famous The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Thomas Kuhn claimed that 
textbooks (and thus also handbooks, one might add) have many important roles that have been 
underestimated in our understanding of the nature and development of science. Students, for 
example, get socialized to the practices of science through examples and norms documented in 
textbooks. They are, so to say, framed into the current paradigm with the help of textbooks; they 
learn a new life-form. Textbooks and handbooks also document the changes of science, and thus 
scientific revolutions could be read off from the pages of them. But, they might have many more 
important functions in the republic of scholars. 
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science (OHPoS), edited by Paul Humphreys, with 
its 900 pages and 42 essays, is a magnificent collection of essays by leading scholars. In the first 
sections of this review, the content of the volume is summarized, and in the second part, some 
remarks are added regarding what is documented in this particular textbook about the current status 
of the philosophy of science.  
OHPoS consists of three major parts. The first is devoted to ‘Overviews.’ As Humphreys 
claims in the ‘Introduction,’ philosophy of science has recently become philosophies of science (in 
the plural), and the first section documents this fragmentation. There are chapters on computational 
sciences (it is, as its title says, more like an ‘advertisement’), social sciences, biology, psychology 
and cognitive sciences, and physical sciences. The last, by Stathis Psillos, is devoted to ‘general 
philosophy of science’ (GPoS). 
Despite the many philosophies of X (where X ranges over scientific disciplines like physics, 
biology, economics, medicine etc.), Psillos argues that GPoS is unavoidable, where the subject of 
general philosophy of science is ‘Science-in-general’ (144.), the latter being a rational abstraction. It 
is claimed that GPoS has both an explicative and a critical function: it can explicate those similarities 
and differences that a certain notion (e.g., explanation, experience) exhibits in the various scientific 
fields. As a matter of fact, this strategy of explication is sensitive to the historical and actual details 
of scientific practice, thus it does not correspond to what might be called the ‘general philosophy of 
science before the 1960s’ which was criticized by so many post-Kuhnians. 
That is why GPoS in Psillos’s sense and particular philosophies of sciences form a ‘seamless 
web’ (155.). ‘Biology, strictly speaking,’ says Psillos (155.), ‘is a cluster of sciences or disciplines: 
ecology, paleontology, synthetic biology, and others … The philosophy of biology-in-general stands 
to the philosophies of various biological subdisciplines as GPoS stands to philosophies of the various 
sciences.’ One might well wonder, however, where this path leads: if philosophy of biology is to be 
preferred (according to many recently) to GPoS (or its earlier renderings) just because of its being 
more particular (and hence concrete and substantive), then philosophical investigation of 
paleontology (say ‘philosophy of paleontology’) is to be preferred to philosophy of biology for the 
very same reasons. But as it happens to every scientific idea, ‘philosophy of paleontology’ will have 
its own renderings, versions, and sub-disciplines, like ‘philosophy of paleoclimatology.’ Today’s 
‘bottom-up substantial philosophies of science’ will be tomorrow’s ‘top-down general philosophy of 
science.’ 
Nonetheless, every chapter of Part 1 could be read both as a summary of the field and as an 
original paper, dealing with the possibilities and critical points of the given field. Though one shall 
not be dissatisfied at all and should keep in mind that a single volume—900 pages and 42  
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chapters—could not cover everything, there are (and will be) fields that are uncovered and painfully  
missing. While jurisprudence and law are treated in a different Oxford Handbook, their omission is 
understandable and appropriate; the neglect of philosophy of chemistry, however, is quite curious. 
Part 2 of OHPoS is devoted to so-called ‘traditional topics.’ The label is justified with the 22 
chapters, each on a specific topic and written by a leading scholar. Such issues as causation, 
induction, confirmation, determinism, epistemology, ethics, the notion of experiment, laws of nature, 
models, probability, explanation, nature of theories, progress and realism, etc. are treated in detail 
and with great precision. Though there are minor overlaps, they are always reasonable and 
proportional, and thus the individual chapters are suitable for the classroom. 
The final 13 chapters are gathered under the label ‘New Directions.’ Important themes such 
as astrophysics, complexity theory, computer simulation, the nature and role of data, emergence, 
neuroscience, and some recent arguments against evolutionary theory are introduced and discussed. 
Furthermore, classical themes, like cosmology, empiricism, sociology of science, mechanical 
philosophy, and the influence of Thomas Kuhn are reviewed in the light of contemporary literature. 
In this part, most of the cited publications in the bibliographies are between 2000 and 2016; a major 
part is from between 1990 and 2000, and from before 1990 mainly classical texts are cited. 
‘Complexity Theory’ and ‘Social Organization of Science,’ written by Michael Strevens and Martin 
Carrier respectively, are the only exceptions, and the question arises whether these documents are of 
interest to the authors or whether the literature of these fields should be renewed from now on. 
A few more words about the significance and documentation value of OHPoS may be in 
order. Two different works may have played similar roles in the twentieth century. One of them is 
Herbert Feigl’s and May Brodbeck’s Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953). The other is International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (University 
of Chicago Press, 1938-1969, IEUS), edited by Rudolf Carnap, Charles Morris, and Otto Neurath. 
The former is a collection of essays with an influential introduction by Brodbeck. It summarized the 
current state of the discipline with (reprinted) articles written by leading (mainly logical empiricist) 
scholars. The other was the enormous project of Neurath representing the various scientific 
disciplines from the viewpoint of unified science. 
While Brodbeck called attention to the fact that science has its own social, psychological, 
historical and ethical dimension, philosophy of science shall abstract from all these in order to pursue 
logical analysis. On the other hand, as many have argued recently, IEUS had its own social and 
political connotations even on the level of philosophy of science (given that the authors of the 
movement talked about ‘philosophy’ at all). The various philosophical, logical and meta-scientific 
questions of the sciences (like physics, biology, linguistics, economics, cosmology, psychology, 
probability, etc.) were addressed mainly from this perspective. 
The point is that while both Feigl-Brodbeck and the editors of IEUS declared their intentions 
of what should be considered as philosophy of science, OHPoS does not. It shows that since Thomas 
Kuhn’s Structure, philosophy of science has had many struggles over history, sociology, relativism, 
antirealism, and the values connected to and detached from science, and also that ‘the challenges 
posed by the Kuhnian era have largely been answered’ and that ‘[t]he philosophy of science absorbed 
lessons from historical studies of science’ (8). This being said, it seems that philosophy of science 
should not be identified or correlated with history or sociology of science and there is indeed a certain 
domain that is apt for genuinely philosophical analysis. But a detailed definition or an explicit 
statement that unites the individual chapters is missing. 
Be that as it may, again without being greedy, a few more chapters would have been useful, 
and not just for the balance of the alternative accounts of philosophy of science. The reader may want 
some information on the history of philosophy of science—as regards the happenings of the twentieth  
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century. Historical philosophy of science is also missing, though it is a rapidly growing form and/or 
sub-discipline of philosophy of science. 
Hans Reichenbach required that ‘[t]he philosophy of physics should be as neat and clear as 
physics itself’ (Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, University of California Press, 
1944/1965, vii). If we know how clear and neat science is, philosophy of science could indeed aim 
at that grade of clearness and neatness. It is a further (meta?-) question whether the truth of the 
conditional’s antecedent is (in)dependent of philosophy of science. 
The hardcover edition of OHPoS is well-structured and edited (with a useful index) and will 
be a nice adornment to bookshelves. What is more important, however, is that the Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Science is a real masterpiece for anyone who teaches and/or does 
research in philosophy of science. It’s worth every penny. Or cents—depending on your space-time 
location. 
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